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I.  Introduction 
 The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the daily lives of everyone by giving 
increased access to information and consumer transactions, while also adding change and 
further complexity to the law.  Gambling has adapted to the arrival of the Internet with 
online sports books2 and online casino gambling,3 both developing a presence on the 
Internet.  These new online casinos have begun to advertise both on the Internet and 
through more traditional broadcasting, like radio and television.4  As a result, the 
Department of Justice has begun to crack down on online casino advertisers, primarily by 
threatening prosecution against advertisers through the Wire Act (18 U.S.C. § 1084).  
One of these advertisers is Casinocity.com, a for-profit Louisiana corporation that runs a 
website that disseminates information about online casinos, casino-style games, and 
sports betting.5 In June 2003, the Department of Justice sent a memo to the National 
Association of Broadcasters warning that those who advertised for online casinos could 
                                                 
1 University of Pittsburgh School of Law, J.D. expected 2006. 
2 See Sportsbook.com, at  http://www.sportsbook.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (sports books allow 
gamblers to place bets on the outcome of various outcomes of a sporting event like the final score of the 
game or the total points scored in the game). 
3
 See Goldenpalace.com, at http://www.goldenpalace.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (online casinos allow 
bettors to play traditional casino games like blackjack and roulette). 
4 See Brent Jex, Online Casinos: A New Area for Presentation, 2002 UCLA J. L. & TECH. NOTES 8 (2002) 
(noting that online casinos are the fifth largest industry advertiser in the United States).  
5 See Casinocity.com, at http://www.casinocity.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
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face felony prosecutions with possible imprisonment and heavy fines if advertisers 
continued airing online casino advertisements. 6  Casinocity.com believes that the threats 
of the Department of Justice violate the free speech rights of the advertisers and has left 
many advertisers fearful of continuing to advertise their casinos.7  Casinocity.com also 
argues that the reduction in advertisements has economically hampered those who rely on 
advertising revenues from online casinos.8  The website filed suit against the Department 
of Justice in 2004 and sought a declaratory judgment that regulation of online casino 
advertisements violates Casinocity.com’s First Amendment rights.9  In addition, the 
website also sought an injunction to prevent the Department of Justice from prosecuting 
Casinocity.com for advertising online casinos.10  After an adverse ruling in the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, the case is pending in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
 Casinocity.com and betonsports.com have begun a public awareness campaign to 
increase support for online casino advertising, but despite these efforts, some online 
casino advertisers have settled with the government to prevent future prosecution for 
                                                 
6 See Complaint for Plaintiff at 2, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice,  No. 04-557-B-M3, 
(M.D.La. filed Aug. 9, 2004), available at  http://online.casinocity.com/FirstAmendment/action.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2005).  
 
7 See Complaint for Plaintiff at 2, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice,  No. 04-557-B-M3, 
(M.D.La. filed Aug. 9, 2004), available at  http://online.casinocity.com/FirstAmendment/action.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2005); See also Lorraine Wollert, Can Online Betting Change Its Luck, BUSINESS WEEK, 
Dec. 20, 2004, available at  http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_51/b3913097.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2005). 
8 Complaint for Plaintiff at 3, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3, 
(M.D.La. filed Aug. 9, 2004), available at  http://online.casinocity.com/FirstAmendment/action.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2005). 
9 See Online Casino City, Casino City Files Suit Against U.S. Department of Justice to Establish its First 
Amendment Right to Advertise Online Casinos and Sportsbooks, ONLINE CASINO CITY, August 9, 2004, 
available at http://online.casinocity.com/firstamendment/ (last visited March 7, 2006).  
10 Id.  
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advertising for online casinos.11  Recently, three St. Louis area radio stations paid the 
Department of Justice $158,000 to avoid further prosecution for its online casino 
advertising.12  As part of their settlement, the radio stations also admitted that their 
activities were illegal, adding further spark to the debate about the legality of online 
casino advertising.13 
 Despite the recent admission of the three St. Louis radio stations and the U.S. 
District Court ruling, the legality of online casino advertising is still a largely unsettled 
issue.  In deciding the issue, courts will have to apply current case law regarding casino 
advertising to an online casino context.  This means that the Supreme Court’s Central 
Hudson test for commercial speech regulation will guide the court’s analysis in this case, 
with its analysis hinging on whether or not online gambling is found to be legal.  A court 
will also have to solve jurisdictional issues, as laws on the legality of gambling are 
different throughout the United States.  All the potential solutions to this issue have 
pitfalls.  A court will have to decide on an alternative that is reasonable and respects 
jurisdictional and federalism concerns.   Ultimately, the court should find that there is no 
effective way to control online gambling and no major benefit to prohibiting online 
casino advertisements.   
In order to completely understand the issue presented to the court, Section II of 
this paper will discuss the development of commercial speech law, and Section III will 
show modern application of the Central Hudson test to casino advertising.  Section IV 
                                                 
11 Betonsports.com Joins Free Speech Fight, Casinocity.com, Sep. 8, 2004, available at   
http://www.onlinecasinonews.com/ocnv2_1/article/article.asp?id=6293 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
12 U.S. Radio Stations pay up for advertising iGaming Site, Casinocity.com,  Sept. 29, 2004, available at  
http://www.onlinecasinonews.com/ocnv2_1/article/article.asp?id=6458 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
13 U.S. Radio Stations pay up for advertising iGaming Site, Casinocity.com,  Sept. 29, 2004, available at  
http://www.onlinecasinonews.com/ocnv2_1/article/article.asp?id=6458 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
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discusses laws that can be applied to online casino advertising, while Section V applies 
the Central Hudson test to an online casino advertising circumstance.  Section VI 
discusses the U.S. District Court’s February 2005 ruling, while Section VII discusses 
likely outcomes to Casinocity.com’s litigation. Finally, Section VII offers my opinion on 
what should be the result of the case.  
 
II. The Development of Commercial Speech Law  
A. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 
 
 Commercial speech law began its development with the 1977 case, Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, where the Supreme Court 
held that commercial speech was a right protected by the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.14  While the Court recognized the right to commercial speech, it also 
held that commercial speech was not an absolute right and could be regulated.15  In their 
decision, the Supreme Court had to balance the protections provided by the First 
Amendment and the government’s right to regulate commerce, opining, “[i]n concluding 
that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it 
can never be regulated in any way.  Some forms of commercial speech regulation are 
surely permissible.”16  The Court reasoned that commercial speech was protected because 
the speech was not so removed from any “exposition of ideas,” . . .  and from “truth, 
science, morality, and arts in general . . .  that it lacks all protection . . . .”17  The decision 
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy laid the framework for the Supreme Court’s Central 
                                                 
14 Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).  
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 770. 
17 Id. at 762. 
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Hudson decision that established the current test for the permissibility of government 
regulation of commercial speech.  
B. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York  
 
 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court expanded upon the groundwork it 
recognized in the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case by establishing a four prong test 
to assess the constitutionality of government regulation of commercial speech.  In 1973, 
the Public Service Commission of New York banned all advertising for commercial 
utilities because the New York state utility commission did not have adequate fuel 
supplies to furnish all customer demands for the upcoming winter.18  After the state’s 
energy shortage subsided three years later, the Public Service Commission assessed 
whether or not to continue their advertising ban.19 The Public Service Commission 
divided utility advertising into two groups—promotional advertising and informational 
advertising.20  Promotional advertising was advertising that encouraged people to use a 
utility, while informational advertising was more of a public service message — such as 
encouraging consumers to use electricity during non-peak usage hours. After 
deliberation, the Public Service Commission extended the ban only on promotional 
advertising because the Commission believed that allowing promotional advertising did 
not advance their interest in energy conservation.21 Central Hudson then filed suit, 
arguing that the ban on promotional advertising violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  
                                                 
18 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 558-59 (1980). 
19 Id. at 559.  
20 Id. at 559-60. 
21 Id. 
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 The Supreme Court reaffirmed their position from Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy, noting that commercial speech had some First Amendment protection but 
could still be regulated.  The Court then laid out a four part test for commercial speech 
regulation.  The first prong of the Central Hudson test allows regulation of speech that is 
more likely than not to deceive the public and to speech that concerns illegal activity.22  If 
the speech is neither deceptive nor illegal, then the government’s ability to regulate 
commercial speech is greatly limited.  Second, the government must have a substantial 
government interest in regulating the commercial speech.23  Third, the government’s 
interest must be directly advanced by the proposed regulation on speech.24  Finally, if the 
first three criteria are met, the government regulation must be the least restrictive way to 
advance the substantial government interest.25  
 In applying the new test, the Supreme Court ruled that the Public Service 
Commission’s regulation violated Central Hudson’s right to commercial speech.26  The 
Court found that the first prong of the test was not at issue, as both parties acknowledged 
the advertising was lawful and not misleading.27  Second, the Court affirmed the Public 
Service Commission’s two substantial government interests.  The Court agreed that the 
Commission had a substantial interest in discouraging further energy consumption and in 
preventing more peak usage of utilities that would result in higher rates for utilities 
consumers.28  Third, the Court concluded that the regulation directly advanced the 
Commission’s interest in energy conservation.  However, the Court did not believe that 
                                                 
22 Id. at 564. 
23 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp, 447 U.S. at 564. 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 572. 
27 Id. at 566.  
28 Id. at 568. 
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the Public Service Commission’s regulation was the least restrictive means to advance its 
government interest because the Commission could not prove that an individual’s energy 
consumption was directly linked to promotional advertising.29  In fact, the Court stated 
that promotional advertising might increase energy conservation because it would allow 
utilities to advertise energy-saving devices.30  Alternatively, the Court noted that the 
government interests could be more effectively advanced by regulating the type and 
content of promotional advertising rather than banning all types of commercial 
advertising.31  These apparent gaps in the Public Service Commission’s rule led the 
Supreme Court to overturn the regulation against promotional advertising of utilities. 
III. Modern application of the Central Hudson Test  
A. Greater New Orleans Broadcast Ass’n v. United States  
 In 1999, the Supreme Court issued its most recent decision regarding casino 
advertising in Greater New Orleans Broadcast Ass’n v. United States.  The plaintiff, 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, was a conglomerate of radio and 
television broadcasters in the New Orleans area.32  These broadcasters wanted to 
broadcast advertisements for legal, for-profit, private casinos located in Louisiana and 
Mississippi.33  However, the broadcasters did not run these advertisements for fear of 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1304, which prohibits broadcasters from running advertisements for 
private casinos.  The broadcasters sought a judgment that would declare 18 U.S.C. § 1304 
unconstitutional for violating their First Amendment rights.  In addition, the broadcasters 
asked for an injunction that would prohibit future government prosecution for violating 
                                                 
29 Id. at 569. 
30 Id. at 570. 
31 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp, 447 U.S. at 571. 
32 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 180 (1999). 
33 Id. at 180-81. 
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this act.34  In deciding the case, the Supreme Court used the four-prong Central Hudson 
test but also focused on the evolution of federal statutes regarding casino advertising. 
 In its analysis, the Supreme Court focused on the evolution of federal casino 
advertising statutes, noting that several statutes had recently been enacted that allowed 
for some casino advertising.  The first major loophole occurred in the 1970s, when the 
federal government carved out an exception to allow advertising for state-run lotteries.35  
Second, in 1988, Congress passed a law allowing for Indian tribes to build and run 
private casinos.  This regulation also gave broadcasters permission to advertise for tribal-
based casinos. 36 Finally, the Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act, which was 
also passed in 1988, allowed advertising for any lottery, game, or similar scheme if 
conducted by “(i) any governmental organization; (ii) any not-for-profit organization; or 
(iii) a commercial organization as a promotional activity clearly occasional and ancillary 
to the primary business of that organization.”37 The primary purpose behind the Court’s 
analysis of these recent federal regulations was to show a trend towards greater 
acceptance of gambling as a legal and legitimate activity.  Further, most of these 
regulations showed a more relaxed opinion towards gambling and suggested that 18 
U.S.C. § 1304 was no longer an effective regulation. 
 In addition to the above statutory analysis, the Supreme Court used the Central 
Hudson test to determine the permissibility of commercial speech regulation.  As was the 
case in Central Hudson, the first prong of the test, a legal and non-misleading activity, 
                                                 
34 Id. at 181. 
35 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 178. 
36 Id. at 178-79. 
37 Id. at 179. 
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was not in dispute.38  The advertising in question was legal because the advertisements 
were to be broadcast in Louisiana, where casino gambling is legal.  The Court accepted 
with reservation the two substantial government interests that were given. The 
government argued that a ban on casino advertising would advance the substantial 
governmental interests of “(1) reducing the social costs associated with ‘gambling’ or 
‘casino gambling,’ and (2) assisting States that ‘restrict gambling’ or ‘prohibit casino 
gambling’ within their own borders.”39 In supporting the government interests asserted, 
the Court noted “the social costs that support the suppression of gambling are offset, and 
sometimes outweighed, by countervailing policy considerations, primarily in the form of 
economic benefits” gained by gambling.40  Nonetheless, the Court expressed its greatest 
concerns about a prohibition on casino advertising in the final two prongs of the Central 
Hudson test. 
 The government argued their regulation advanced substantial government 
interests because prohibiting casino advertising would lessen the demand for gambling.41  
The government also argued their regulation prevented the detrimental effects persuasive 
advertising could have on compulsive gamblers.42 Finally, the government asserted that 
their restriction helped protect bordering states that prohibit gambling from facing the 
negative social and economic effects that result from broadcasts of casino advertising.43   
The Supreme Court did not accept the government’s rationales, believing that 
promotional advertising for casinos would likely channel gamblers to a specific casino 
                                                 
38 Id. at 184. 
39 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 185.  
40 Id. at 186.  
41 Id. at 188-89. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 194. 
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and not greatly increase the number of total gamblers.44  The Court also found that any 
measure of the effectiveness of the Government's attempt to minimize the social costs of 
gambling is undermined by the federal government’s encouragement of tribal casino 
gambling.  The federal government’s encouragement of tribal casino gambling meant that 
states that prohibited gambling would not be helped by a regulation that only prohibited 
certain types of casino advertising.45  The Court elaborated that the government is 
committed to “prohibiting accurate product information, not commercial enticements of 
all kinds, and then only when conveyed over certain forms of media and for certain types 
of gambling . . . despite the fact that messages about the availability of such gambling are 
being conveyed over the airwaves . . . .”46  Though the Court prohibited regulation of 
casino advertising in Greater New Orleans Broadcast Ass’n, other cases have upheld 
regulation of casino advertising.47 
B. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 
 While Greater New Orleans Broadcast Association established that casino 
advertising was permissible in states that allowed casino advertising, Edge Broadcasting 
Co. affirmed the right of non-gambling states to prohibit lottery-related advertising within 
their respective borders.48  This 1993 Supreme Court case dealt with whether or not 
lottery advertising from a state that did not permit the lottery was permissible if part of 
the broadcaster’s intended audience lived in a state that did allow for a lottery.49  Edge 
Broadcasting owned a radio station licensed in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, which was 
                                                 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 191. 
47 Id. at 195. 
48 United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).  
49 Id. at 423.  
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three miles from the North Carolina and Virginia borders.50 The station’s goal was to 
reach a largely Virginian audience.  Edge Broadcasting wanted to broadcast 
advertisements for the Virginia Lottery, but was forbidden to do so under 18 U.S.C. § 
1304.  However, under 18 U.S.C. § 1307, an exception to the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 
1304 is given to advertisers in states that permit lotteries. 51  Because North Carolina did 
not permit a state lottery, Edge Broadcasting sought an order in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia declaring that 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1307 were 
unconstitutional.52 Additionally, Edge Broadcasting also sought an injunction against the 
enforcement of these regulations.53  The District Court held that the regulation did not 
pass the Central Hudson test because it did not directly advance a substantial government 
interest.54  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this decision.55 
 The Supreme Court quickly affirmed the first two prongs of the Central Hudson 
test noting that if advertisements were permitted they would concern a lawful and non-
misleading activity (the lottery is a legal activity in Virginia).56  In addition, the Court 
also affirmed the stated government interests of protecting the rights of states that do not 
allow the lottery and not interfering in the advertising of those states that do allow for 
state lotteries.57  The more contentious issue for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court was whether or not the government interest was directly 
advanced by the regulation promulgated by the state. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S at 424. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 424-25. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 426. 
57 Id. 
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that a substantial government interest was advanced by the regulation.58  The Supreme 
Court believed the regulation advanced a government interest because it protected the 
rights of those states that did not have a state lottery, but did not restrict the rights of 
those states that wanted to advertise a lottery.59  The Court noted it was impossible to 
completely suppress lottery advertising in those states that forbid the lottery, so this was 
the best compromise available to all states.60  The Court also found that the regulation 
was narrowly tailored as required by the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test because 
the restriction was the only way to protect North Carolina’s interest in preventing lottery 
advertisements.61  Edge Broadcasting leaves a rule that proves to be confusing for online 
casino cases: gambling-related advertising is permissible in states that allow for 
gambling, but may be prohibited in states that prohibit advertising.  Applying these Court 
decisions to online casino advertising will prove to be troublesome because of the 
undefined jurisdictional bounds of the Internet. 
C. Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States  
 A 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit helps to define the 
rule given in Edge Broadcasting.  Valley Broadcasting ran two Nevada television stations 
that broadcasted primarily in Nevada.62  Valley Broadcasting wanted to run 
advertisements for local casinos in Nevada, where gambling was legal.63  However, in 
addition to its Nevada audience, Valley Broadcasting’s signal reached audiences in Utah 
                                                 
58 Id. at 428-29.  
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S at 429.  
62 Valley Broad. Co v. United States., 107 F.3d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997).  
63 Id. 
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and California.64  Valley Broadcasting sought an injunction from the court against 18 
U.S.C. § 1304 so that it could advertise for these Nevada-based private casinos.65  
 In its analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the first two 
prongs of the Central Hudson test stating that the advertisements would be legal and non-
misleading. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also recognized the government’s 
interests in reducing public attention to gambling and protecting the interests of those 
states that do not permit casino gambling within their borders.66  The Court found that 18 
U.S.C. § 1304 did not pass the Central Hudson test because it did not directly advance 
the government interest.  The Court noted concerns about exceptions to 18 U.S.C. § 1304 
that limit the effectiveness of a ban on casino advertising.67  Specifically, the court 
mentioned exceptions granted to state-run lotteries, fishing contests, not-for-profit 
lotteries, promotional lotteries and tribal-run casinos.68  The court believed that these 
exceptions were substantial enough to make the advancement of the government interest 
ineffective.69  Valley Broadcasting indicates that the site of the advertising determines the 
legality of the advertising.  As a result, broadcasters located in a state that permits 
gambling are allowed to run advertisements for private casinos regardless of whether or 
not those advertisements reach states that do not permit gambling. On the other hand, 
broadcasters in states that do not permit gambling are not allowed to advertise for private 
casinos even if a majority of the broadcaster’s audience is in a state that permits 
gambling.  
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Valley Broad. Co., 107 F.3d at 1330-31. 
67 Id. at 1334. 
68 Id. at 1334. 
69 Id.  
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IV. Federal Statutes That Could Be Applied To Online Casinos 
A.18 U.S.C. § 1084:  The Wire Act 
 The federal government has referenced the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, as its 
likely avenue for prosecuting those who advertise for online casinos.  The act makes it 
illegal to transmit or to help transmit over wire communication bets or wagers on sporting 
events, money that would assist in placing a bet, or any information that would assist in 
placing a bet or wager on a sporting event.70  The Act provides a safe-harbor exemption if 
the transaction is between two locations where gambling is legal.71 The policy of the 
federal government is that advertising for these online casinos is equivalent to providing 
information that would assist in placing an illegal wager.  However, it is important to 
note that many commentators believe that traditional casino gambling is not covered by 
the Wire Act.72 
 The application of the Wire Act to online casino advertising has a few problems.  
First, some observers have doubts as to whether the Internet should be considered a wire 
communication.  Certainly the Internet was not a wire communication as envisioned by 
Congress when it promulgated this act in 1961.  A recent article suggests that Congress 
should amend the Wire Act to ensure that Internet transactions fall under wire 
communications as defined by the Act.73  Second, the Wire Act only deals with sports 
bets and wagers.  Online casinos that only have traditional casino games, like blackjack 
and roulette, would not fall under the scope of the Wire Act even if the act were amended 
                                                 
70 Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2004).  
71 Id. § 1084(b).  
72 Lawrence Walters, Advertising Online Casinos: An analysis of legal rights and risks, 7 GAMING L. REV. 
111, 116 (2003) (illustrates potential problems with the Wire Act).  
73 No Ads for Foreign Casinos, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 3, 2004, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0903/p08s01-comv.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004). 
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to include Internet transactions.  While the Wire Act likely has some application to the 
regulation of online casino advertising, the federal government would run into problems 
if it tried to apply the act to all online casino gambling as the Act is currently 
promulgated.  
B. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1307:  Broadcasting Lottery Information 
 18 U.S.C. § 1304, which deals with gambling advertising, is another statute that 
could be applied against those who allow online casino advertising.  The provision makes 
it illegal for any radio or television station to knowingly broadcast any advertisement or 
information related to any lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme or to offer prizes 
based on a lottery or similar scheme.74 Though 18 U.S.C. § 1304 does not specifically 
reference private casino gambling, the regulation was nevertheless used to prosecute the 
broadcasters in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States and 
could be applied to radio or television stations that advertise for online casinos.  A 
separate statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1307, provides an exception to 18 U.S.C. § 1304 in states 
that permit a lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.  18 U.S.C. § 1304 and § 1307 are 
consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
Association  v. United States because both allow for private casino advertising in states 
that permit gambling and forbid advertising in states that prohibit gambling. 
V. Application of the Central Hudson test to online casino advertising 
 As was discussed in Section III, because the advertising would be classified as 
commercial speech, a court would use the Central Hudson test as its mode of analysis to 
evaluate the legality of online casino advertising.  While it is impossible to predict with 
certainty how the courts would apply the test, a court would have to examine previous 
                                                 
74 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2004).  
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case law regarding traditional casino advertising to decide the legality of online casino 
advertising.  Under this assumption, a court’s analysis would be based on current case 
law indicating that casino advertising is permissible in those states that allow for 
gambling, while such advertising would be illegal in those states that do not allow 
gambling.  However, a more detailed look at the Central Hudson test is necessary to 
predict the legal standing of online casino advertising.   
 
 
A. Substantial Government Interest 
 The second prong of the Central Hudson test requires the government to have a 
substantial government interest in regulating the proposed commercial speech.75  The 
government has generally given two interests in regulating traditional casino advertising.  
First, the government has argued that a regulation on casino advertising discourages 
people from gambling, which in turn decreases the negative economic and social costs 
that can result from compulsive gambling.76  Second, the government has argued that a 
restriction on casino advertising protects the interests of those states that do not permit 
gambling.77  Courts have, without much debate, historically affirmed these two interests 
as substantial government interests.78 Only in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
Association did the Supreme Court express reservation with the government interests, 
                                                 
75
 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. 
76 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 185. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.; See also Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 426; Valley Broad. Co., 107 F.3d at 1330-31. 
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noting that the social and economic losses that result from compulsive gambling might be 
offset by other economic gains that result from gambling.79 
 Applying these substantial government interests to online casino advertising 
would lead to results similar to previous case law.  The government would still be 
concerned with the negative social and economic effects of gambling.80  Online casinos 
provide increased access to potential gamblers so the government could argue that 
compulsive gambling may be even more detrimental to those users who are only a click 
away from gambling.81  Second, the government would still have a responsibility to 
protect the interests of those states that prohibit gambling. 82 Allowing unrestricted 
advertising in states where gambling is illegal infringes on a state’s autonomy to regulate 
issues within its borders.  However, advertisers would not be able to confine their 
advertisements to only those states that permit gambling.  This dilemma leads to a series 
of jurisdictional questions that will be discussed in further detail later in this note.  
In addition to the previously asserted interests, the government also has an interest 
in protecting consumers from potentially “crooked” online casino games.83  Gambling 
online is a risky proposition because there is no way to guarantee the authenticity of a 
game.  For example, in a traditional casino game of roulette, a gambler can be guaranteed 
that if the ball landed on a certain number, the result was legitimate.  With traditional 
casinos, state gambling regulators have the ability to ensure that casinos in their state are 
                                                 
79 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 186. 
80 See Theresa Loscalzo & Stephen Shapiro, Internet Gambling Policy: Prohibition versus Regulation, 7 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 11 (2000) (describes the potential new social and economic risks associated with 
online gambling). 
81 See Theresa Loscalzo & Stephen Shapiro, Internet Gambling Policy: Prohibition versus Regulation, 7 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 11 (2000) 
82 See supra § III-B. 
83 See Loscalzo & Shapiro, Internet Gambling Policy: Prohibition versus Regulation, 7 VILL. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 11 (2000). 
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fair and honest.84  However, there is no such guarantee in an online casino.  A website 
could program its online casinos to never allow a gambler to win or for the gambler to 
win a smaller percentage of games than he or she would statistically win in a traditional 
casino.  Because these casinos are often outside of a state’s jurisdiction, states would not 
be able to effectively regulate gambling like they can with traditional casinos.  
B. Advancement of the Substantial Government Interests  
 Advancement of a substantial interest has been more troublesome for the 
government to prove than the existence of the substantial interest.  Several recent 
decisions have held that the government had not substantially advanced its interests 
because legislative exceptions to the ban on casino advertising make other attempts to 
ban casino advertising ineffective.  Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association 
catalogued the several legislative exceptions that made the regulation ineffective.  
Included in the court’s analysis were exceptions granted to state-run lotteries, to tribal-
owned private casinos, and to lotteries or similar schemes if run by state governments, 
charitable organizations, or those ancillary to a company’s business.85 Courts have also 
said that the government’s interest in preventing the negative effects of gambling are not 
helped by a ban on advertising because casino advertising does not encourage someone to 
gamble, but rather encourages someone to gamble at a particular casino.86  As a result, 
the growing trend in traditional casino advertising analysis is not to affirm the 
government’s advancement of the substantial government interest. 
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 When applying this second prong to an online casino advertising situation, the 
courts will reach results similar to those in other recent casino advertising cases.  A court 
would most likely decide that the legislative exceptions that have invalidated regulations 
in cases like Greater New Orleans Broad. Association would invalidate an attempted ban 
on online casino advertising.87  While online gambling may be somewhat different from 
traditional casino gambling, the negative social and economic effects of gambling are the 
same.88  Even though exceptions cited in previous cases do not concern online gambling, 
a court should find that these exceptions weaken an argument for regulating online casino 
advertising.  However, these exceptions may not be enough to invalidate a regulation on 
online casino advertising.  For instance, a court may find that the negative effect of online 
gambling is greater than traditional gambling and may want to discourage online 
gambling at all costs.  In this scenario, the court would uphold the advancement of the 
government’s interest despite the exceptions cited by the Supreme Court in its recent 
decisions.  In effect, the court may find the potential harm of online gambling greater 
than any flaws in the government’s argument.   
 When examining the advancement of a substantial government interest, the courts 
should realize that a ban on online casino advertising cannot be entirely effective.  Since 
the Internet does not conform to traditional notions of borders and jurisdictions, enforcing 
a ban on online casino advertising becomes difficult.89  Even assuming a one-hundred 
percent effective ban on online casino advertising in the United States, the government 
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would not be able to guarantee that United States citizens would never see advertisements 
for foreign online casinos.90  The federal government would have little recourse to 
prosecute advertisers from other countries who advertise online casinos on their 
websites.91  Therefore, courts will have several countervailing considerations to weigh 
when deciding whether or not a ban on online casino advertising is effective enough to 
allow the government regulation to stand. 
 
 
C. Narrowly Tailored Regulation 
 Even if a court finds a substantial government interest that is advanced by the 
regulation against online casino advertising, the regulation will fail if it is not the least 
restrictive means available to advance the substantial government interest.  The narrowly 
tailored prong of the Central Hudson test requires that a government regulation be the 
least restrictive method of advancing the government interest.92  For example, a 
regulation making all televisions illegal in order to prevent televised gambling 
advertisements would not be the least restrictive way of advancing an interest in 
preventing gambling advertisements.  Recent decisions on the issue have either upheld 
this prong of the test without much analysis or stopped short of the prong because the 
regulation failed the Central Hudson test before the prong was to be analyzed.   
                                                 
90 See Laura Bak-Boychuk, Internet Gambling: Is Avoiding Prosecution as Easy as Moving the Business 
Operations Offshore, 6 SW. J OF L. & TRADE AM. 363, 383 (1999) (predicts that online gambling would be 
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YALE L.J. 1569, 1599-1603 (1999) (argues that federal law would easily reach into other countries to 
prosecute those who offer online gambling). 
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Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association and Valley Broadcasting did not 
reach this prong of the Central Hudson test because these decisions held that the 
respective government regulations did not directly advance the stated government 
interests.93  As a result, the regulations were invalidated before the court considered 
whether or not the regulation was narrowly tailored.94  In Edge Broadcasting, however, 
the Court held that the proposed government regulation was narrowly tailored because 
the ban on lottery advertising was the only way to effectively prevent lottery advertising 
in North Carolina (which did not permit a state lottery).95  This prong of the test will be 
considered only if a court finds that the regulation passed the first two prongs of the 
Central Hudson test. If a court does analyze this prong of the Central Hudson test, it will 
find that the government regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored.  A court would 
realize there is no method of enforcing an online casino advertising ban that is less 
intrusive.  The regulation is narrowly tailored and only directly affects those who 
advertise for online casinos.  As a result, if a court affirms the first two prongs of the test, 
it would likely affirm the narrowly tailored prong of the Central Hudson test.  
D.  Legal and Non-misleading Activity 
 For the issue at hand, the most important prong of the Central Hudson test is the 
legal and non-misleading activity requirement.96  Even if online casino advertising passes 
the other three prongs of the Central Hudson test, the regulation will be permitted if the 
activity to be advertised is illegal or misleading.  Analysis of this requirement is difficult 
because the Internet creates an entirely new set of circumstances for personal jurisdiction 
                                                 
93 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 188; Valley Broad. Co., 107 F.3d at 1334. 
94 Id.  
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and the site of the transaction.  It is important to remember that the legal and non-
misleading requirement analyzes the legality of the activity being advertised.  The few 
decisions that exist on the legality of online casino gambling are mixed, but generally 
find that online gambling is illegal.  Consequently, this section analyzes the legality of 
online gambling and not advertising related to online gambling.  
i. United States v. Cohen (Prosecution under the Wire Act) 
 In United States v. Cohen, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a 
conviction against Cohen and his company, World Sports Exchange, for violation of the 
Wire Act.97  Cohen, a United States citizen, moved to Antigua to establish an online 
sports book.98  He required members to register for his book and then wire at least $300 
to Antigua to open their account.  When their respective accounts were opened, the 
members could place their wagers through the Internet or over the telephone.99  The 
sports book collected $5.3 million dollars in the first fifteen months of operation and 
usually took a ten percent cut of each wager collected.  In 1997, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation began investigating the World Sports Exchange, and in 1998 arrested 
Cohen, charging him with eight counts, including violation of the Wire Act.  
 Cohen first argued that the Wire Act’s safe harbor provision gave him an 
exemption from prosecution because gambling is legal in Antigua.100  However, the court 
disagreed with Cohen’s argument by stating that gambling was clearly illegal in New 
York and that the safe harbor provision was only applicable in situations where the 
gambling transaction went from one state with legal gambling to another state with legal 
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gambling.101  Cohen’s second argument was that his customer’s wagers were placed only 
in Antigua; the transmission of information to Antigua was not a bet and that only when 
that information reached Antigua was a bet entered into a customer’s account.102  The 
court said that the site of the actual wager was immaterial because the Wire Act 
prohibited the transmission of information that could lead to wagers and placing bets over 
the phone was clearly aiding wagers to be placed.103 United States v. Cohen shows that an 
online wager is an illegal activity when the Wire Act is applied.  However, the Wire Act 
as currently written only applies to sports gambling, leaving online casinos that do not 
offer sports books free from application of the law.  It is also important to look at 
personal jurisdiction to see if prosecution of traditional online gambling would be 
constitutional.   
ii. Personal Jurisdiction 
 Personal jurisdiction is a crucial element for the court to decide because in states 
where gambling is illegal, an online casino would likely be found to be illegal if the 
casino could be haled into court in the jurisdiction.  Millennium Enterprises v. 
Millennium Music, a 1999 Oregon District Court case, established a framework that has 
been used in many jurisdictional cases involving the Internet.  Millennium Music was a 
trademark infringement case where Millennium Enterprises was trying to get an 
injunction against Millennium Music for using a name similar to Millennium 
Enterprises.104  The case hinged on whether Oregon could get personal jurisdiction over 
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Millennium Music, a South Carolina corporation.105  Included in the jurisdictional 
analysis was whether Millennium Music’s website gave the Court sufficient contacts in 
Oregon to establish jurisdiction.106  The District Court used a test established in Zippo 
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. to analyze whether Millennium could be 
hailed into the Oregon Courts.  The Zippo test set up a sliding scale to analyze the 
commercial nature of the website in question with the underlying theory being that those 
websites that are more commercial in nature are better able to defend themselves in 
courts in a foreign jurisdiction.107  The sliding scale denies jurisdiction when the website 
is purely informational and gives jurisdiction to websites that are commercial and 
transmit substantial business over the Internet.  Generally, websites fall in the middle of 
the scale and have both commercial and informational aspects.108  This test is extremely 
subjective and makes it difficult to give definitive conclusions in which category a 
website belongs.   
 Though Millennium Music provides a general framework to be applied for all 
Internet-based jurisdiction issues, Millennium’s framework has only been applied in bits 
and pieces in other online casino jurisdiction cases.  For example, in Humphrey v. 
Granite Gate Resorts, a Minnesota Appellate Court held that an online casino based in 
Belize that ran advertisements in Minnesota was subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Minnesota because it was soliciting business from citizens outside of Belize.109  Also, the 
United States District Court held in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc, that 
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Instruction Set, a Massachusetts corporation, was subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Connecticut because of the company’s actions through its website.  The court held that 
the website and a toll-free number of the company were sufficient evidence that 
Instruction Set intended to solicit business in Connecticut, and therefore, it was 
reasonable that Instruction Set anticipated being haled into court in Connecticut.110  The 
court further said that “substantial fair play and justice” were not violated because of the 
close distance between Connecticut and Massachusetts.111  This decision has received a 
mixed reception from other courts112 and the Connecticut court’s rationale may have been 
different in an online casino situation where the casinos are usually located outside of the 
United States.  Finally, in New York v. Lipsitz, a New York appellate court held that 
though Internet transactions on their face appear to cloud personal jurisdiction issues, 
application of traditional personal jurisdiction tests has usually been successful in 
deciding personal jurisdiction issues in Internet cases.113 As seen in these cases, there is 
no clear and consistent rule of application for personal jurisdiction issues involving the 
Internet. 
iii. Application under the Central Hudson Test 
 While it is difficult to know how exactly a court would decide the legal and non-
misleading prong of the Central Hudson test, there is a distinct trend of allowing cases to 
be prosecuted in a jurisdiction whenever possible.114  If the standard in Millennium Music 
is used, the commercial activity of the websites would be judged.115  This would produce 
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a subjective test that would require a court to judge the commercial activity of every 
website that facilitates online gambling.  However, most casinos would be subject to 
jurisdiction because an online casinos’ primary activity, soliciting bets from consumers, 
is entirely commercial in nature.  Under the Millennium Music standard it is probable that 
most online casinos would be subject to personal jurisdiction  
Other standards have noted that if the website is able to be viewed in a state, then 
the website is soliciting business in that state and is subject to personal jurisdiction in that 
state.116  Under this analysis, online casinos would be subject to personal jurisdiction in 
every state or country because the casinos would be accessible to website users all over 
the world.  Some courts may find that this standard violates notions of substantial fair 
play and justice in situations where haling the casino into court would be overly 
burdensome.  Under traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, online casinos would be 
subject to jurisdiction only in places where they have conducted business or specifically 
run advertisements.117  Again, substantial fair play and justice may play a role in certain 
cases.  Online casinos are most likely subject to personal jurisdiction in any state no 
matter what mode personal jurisdiction analysis is used if substantial fair play and justice 
is not a problem.  
 As a result, online casinos might be found to be illegal and subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction which would make regulations against online casino advertising permissible 
even if other prongs of the Central Hudson test were not met.118  Personal jurisdiction 
standards created for the Internet include online casinos.  If a court in a state where 
gambling is illegal wants to prosecute an online casino based in Antigua, they would be 
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able to hale the online casino into court and be able to prosecute the online casino if the 
court felt that jurisdiction did not violate notions of substantial fair play and justice.  
Online casino advertising would be illegal in many states because if online gambling is 
illegal then the legal and non-misleading prong of the Central Hudson test could not be 
satisfied.  These results leave a confused situation for the legality of online casino 
advertising that leads to three potential results assuming the U.S. District Court’s 
February 2005 decision has not already settled the legality of online casino advertising.  
VI. The District Court’s Ruling February 2005 Decision 
 On February 17, 2005, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana upheld the federal government’s Motion to Dismiss holding that 
Casinocity.com lacked standing to bring an action for a declaratory judgment.119  The 
District Court reasoned that because Casinocity.com did not receive a letter from the 
Department of Justice, like other broadcasters received, advising Casinocity.com that 
their behavior might be illegal and because Casinocity.com had not been served a 
subpoena, Casinocity.com was not in danger of being sued by the Department of Justice.  
As a result, the court said that Casinocity.com did not need a declaratory judgment to 
protect itself from the government. 120 What is potentially more troubling for 
Casinocity.com is that the court elaborated further saying that even if Casinocity.com had 
standing, the government’s regulation would be permissible because online casinos are 
illegal.121 
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 Casinocity.com has filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
hoping to overturn the District Court’s adverse ruling.  In their appeal, Casinocity.com is 
arguing that they have standing to seek a declaratory judgment while also seeking First 
Amendment protection for its advertising.122  The District Court dismissed 
Casinocity.com’s First Amendment argument without much analysis and it is believed 
that the legality of online casino advertising will be more critically analyzed on appeal.123 
In particular, analysts believe that the court misapplied the Wire Act and also ignored the 
jurisdictional issues discussed previously.124  So, while the initial ruling in 
Casinocity.com’s case is adverse to Casinocity.com, the legality of online casino 
advertising is still an unsettled matter and the issues discussed in this paper are still 
relevant to the resolution of the problem. 
VII. Likely Results 
 The legality of online casino advertising has three probable results.  First, online 
casino advertising could be found to be legal throughout the United States.  Second, 
online casino advertising could be found to be illegal throughout the United States.  
Third, online casino advertising could be found to be legal in states where gambling is 
legal and illegal in states where gambling is illegal.  Regardless, the regulation of online 
casino advertising will be difficult because of universal access of websites to all Internet 
users. 
 Problems exist with an outright ban on online casino advertising or a universal 
acceptance of online casino advertising.  States have a vested interest in protecting the 
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rights of citizens in their states.125  Therefore, an outright ban on online casino advertising 
does not recognize the rights of those in states that allow gambling while a universal 
acceptance of online casino advertising does not protect the right of a state to protect its 
citizens from things the state believes to be illegal.126  Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Association  endorsed this thinking noting that a state that permits 
gambling does not have a sufficient interest in prohibiting casino advertising, but also 
saying that states that forbid gambling have a substantial interest in protecting their 
citizens from casino advertising.127  However, the advantage to no ban or an outright ban 
on advertising is that it avoids the problems of different standards throughout the country.  
If the third approach is taken, and advertising is legal in states that permit gambling and 
illegal in states that forbid gambling, it will be extremely difficult to enforce a fractured 
prohibition.  
The third approach that allows advertising in states where gambling is legal seems 
to be the approach that is most consistent with previous decisions on casino 
advertising.128  As has been discussed before, these decisions are often difficult to apply 
in an online context.  There is no easy way to enforce a ban on online casino advertising 
in a select number of states.129  This is primarily because there is no effective way to 
block online advertisements from reaching an Internet user.  A universal ban on 
advertising would allow government officials to target anybody who advertised online 
casinos to United States citizens, but a mixed result would be difficult to enforce.  For 
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example, an advertiser could not reasonably be held responsible to make sure that those 
in Nevada see the advertisement, while those in Delaware do not.  The result of a mixed 
legality rule seems to be a greater burden than it is worth.  However, an outright ban or 
acceptance of advertising contradicts current court decisions on gambling advertisements.   
VIII. Conclusion  
 Though all three approaches to this issue have serous pitfalls, the most logical 
solution is to allow online casino advertising throughout the United States.  As has been 
noted, a mixed ban would not be easily enforced and would not be an effective ban for 
those states that prohibit gambling.  An outright ban of casino advertising would infringe 
on the rights of those who have the right to gamble within their jurisdiction.   Further, a 
universal ban could not shut down online casinos that would still be able to operate 
within their countries of establishment and would likely still be accessible to those in the 
United States.  Those who still wanted to use online casinos would probably find and 
access online casinos even if all advertising were banned in the United States.  So, the 
most logical application is to permit online casino advertising in the United States.   
The fact remains that the Internet has eliminated traditional notions of boundaries, 
and more specific to the legal world, jurisdictional boundaries.130  Online casino 
gambling is an activity that is nearly impossible to effectively regulate because online 
gambling is a borderless transaction.131  For example, if the Bellgaio, a popular Las 
Vegas casino, opened a casino in a state that forbid gambling, the government of that 
state could go to the casino and close it.  However, an online casino usually reaches 
across the borders of several countries.  If an online casino is based in Bermuda and 
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solicits business globally through its website, how would a government outside Bermuda 
regulate this online casino?  The government could sanction those transactions that reach 
the United States, but it would be powerless to shutdown the virtual casino located in 
Bermuda and would also probably be powerless to prosecute every transaction that 
involved a United States citizen.  So, forbidding online casino advertising is not a 
practical way of preventing online gambling.  
Further, there has been a shift in the United States towards greater acceptance of 
gambling in general.  Pennsylvania is in the process of issuing slot machine licenses to 
certain establishments in the state.132  Also, poker games like Texas Hold ‘Em have 
gained popularity among amateur players and have also received strong ratings on 
various cable networks. 133 Federal legislation has become more permissive as tribal 
casinos have been legalized, and various exceptions for lotteries, charitable games and 
other similar gaming schemes have been permitted.  While allowing online casino 
advertising does not satisfy the interests of all involved parties it offers the most logical 
and enforceable solution to the problem.  The increased acceptance of gambling 
throughout the country seems to make this decision even more practical than an outright 
ban or a mixed ban between the states.   
 Gambling has been a governmental concern for years.  The Internet has given 
great complexity to the regulation of online gambling and more specifically online casino 
advertising.  Unlike traditional gambling advertising which can be regulated state-by-
state, online casino advertising, like online gambling, is a global issue complicated by the 
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borderless nature of the Internet.  The most logical result is to permit online casino 
advertising throughout the United States.  Regardless, the courts will have many difficult 
decisions to make in deciding the legality of online casino advertising in terms of 
applying current case law to an online issue, applying the Wire Act and analyzing 
jurisdiction issues.  After deciding all of these complex issues, the court will have to 
reach a reasonable decision, even though all of the possible results have potentially 
negative effects, like allowing unregulated online gambling to continue or blocking 
access to certain websites to all citizens.  It is very likely that the issue of online casino 
advertising will be appealed through the courts several times before a final decision on its 
legality is determined.  
